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FOREWORD

WHY NATIONS BEHAVE
Jose E. Alvarez*
It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.'
-Louis Henkin
The idea for this symposium on "implementation, compliance and
effectiveness" grew out of the 1997 annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law (ASIL), devoted to that theme. As one of
the co-chairs of that meeting, I suggested to the student editors of this
journal that they solicit articles on a topic that has seized the attention of
researchers within international law as well as in seemingly unrelated
fields. As Professor Thomas Franck has indicated in a recent wellreceived book, an ever increasing number of scholars are going beyond
well-worn debates about whether international law is truly "law" to undertake "post-ontological" inquiries appropriate to the new "maturity"
of the international legal system.' As the 1997 ASIL annual meeting
demonstrated and, as further confirmed by the contributions selected by
the student editors for this volume, today the question of why international norms secure compliance seems to be as popular as more
traditional descriptions of how nations behave, and, at least to some, is a
more relevant line of inquiry than "outdated" debates over whether nations behave.' Compliance inquiries seem particularly germane at a time
when more and more individuals, from academics to journalists, contend that the ever increasing waves of "effective" international
regulation, often involving matters previously ceded to the internal
"domestic jurisdiction" of states, portend the "demise" or even the
"end" of "sovereignty" (at least as traditionally conceived).
*

Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School

(1981); A.B., Oxford University (1979); A.B., Harvard University (1977).
1. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
2.

See THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 5-6

(1995).
3. For a summary of the perennial debates between realists and liberal internationalists
on this last question, see Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L. J.2599, 2608-17 (1997).

4. For examples of the burgeoning recent literature among even "traditional" international lawyers on the continued value of the term "sovereignty," see Louis Henkin,
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The new multidisciplinary empirical and theoretical work on
"implication, compliance and effectiveness" remains, to a considerable
extent, at the definitional stage; the question of what is the "proper" way
of parsing these issues is still very much debated.5 The symposium title
here, like the theme for the 1997 ASIL meeting, draws from the
terminology used by two pioneers in the new wave of compliance
studies, Harold Jacobson, a professor of political science, and Edith
Brown Weiss, a professor of international law.6 In their work (within
international environmental law), Professors Jacobson and Weiss
systematically examine what they consider to be three related but
analytically distinct phenomena. For them, implementation is concerned
with the methods by which States transform international obligations
into acceptable rules within their domestic legal systems.
Implementation may take many forms, including caselaw or executive
orders giving effect to what in the United States would be called a "selfexecuting" treaty or different types of legislative enactments intended to
give effect to other sources of international obligations. States may
International Law: Politics, Values, Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 24-25 (1990);
John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 CoLUM. J. TRANS. L. 157 (1997); John 0.
McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996); Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the
Nation-State and its Implicationsfor InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 7 (1997);
Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Toward a New Paradigmof International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447 (1993). The literature on the topic within political
science is as voluminous. See, e.g., Mark W. Zacker, The Decaying Pillarsof the Westphalian
Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 58 (James N. Rosenau & ErnstOtto Czempiel eds., 1992). As within international law, there is considerable debate among
political scientists with respect to whether current developments represent the "erosion" of
the continued "resilience" of States. Compare Zacker, supra, with Janice E. Thomson &
Stephen D. Krasner, Global Transactionsand the Consolidation of Sovereignty, in GLOBAL
CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES (Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds.,
1989).
5. Definitional difficulties are at least partly due to the many disciplines involved. See
Koh, supra note 3, at 2603 n. 13. For one political scientist's survey of eight distinct approaches that purport to explain the "choice to comply," see Peter Haas, Why Comply or
Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
COMPLIANCE]. For a simpler distillation, reducing much of the literature to two distinct optics ("instrumentalist" versus "normative") allegedly characteristic of political science and
law respectively, and attempting to reconcile the two, see Robert 0. Keohane, International
Relations and InternationalLaw: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 487 (1997).
6. See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with InternationalEnvironmental Accords: Preliminary Observationsfrom a Collaborative Project,
1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995) [hereinafter Jacobson & Weiss, STRENGTHENING
COMPLIANCE]. See also COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
(Edith B. Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1996).
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prefer, often for domestic constitutional reasons, one form of
transformation over another and may experiment with different types of
measures over time. Compliance looks beyond such measures to
whether States actually abide by their procedural and substantive
international obligations, regardless of what the "black letter" of their
domestic laws formally indicate. Compliance may occur without
implementing legislation. On the other hand, a State may not be "in
compliance" with international law even with implementing legislation
in place. Queries directed at effectiveness go beyond those looking at
implementation or compliance to determine whether an international
norm, whatever its source in domestic or international law, achieves its
policy objective. Effectiveness studies evaluate whether the goals of
those who craft the norms are fulfilled, asking whether, for example, at
the end of the day, environmental treaties improve the environment,
arms control measures decrease (or at least stabilize) armaments levels,
or human rights regimes actually protect individuals from governmental
abuse.
As Jacobson and Weiss make clear in their work, the point of
addressing these issues is not ivory tower description. Particularly for
international lawyers involved in such work, hopes for generalizable
prescriptions inspire the quest for the determinants of implementation,
compliance and effectiveness. For the most part, these studies are
quixotic searches for "recipe books:" tools that are more or less
effective either generally or with respect to particular issues or types of
problems. The new compliance scholars are hoping to identify which
characteristics of the actors involved in an activity, the international
environment, or the instrument involved (such as a treaty) have an
impact on the likelihood that any international norm will be given effect.
They are attempting to discover the impact on implementation or
compliance of the numbers of actors involved, the involvement of
multinational corporations or NGOs, or the degree of concentration of
the activity being regulated within certain countries. They also are
trying to examine the impact of the perceived equity of a treaty's
intended results, or of its other characteristics, such as pedigree, origins,
or textual precision. They want to know whether the availability of
sanctions, of an institution, or of dispute settlement matters and if so,
how. Ultimately they would like to demonstrate convincingly not only
why Henkin is right but to suggest ways to replicate the law's successes
in areas heretofore resistant to effective law-making or lawenforcement. At the same time, most of the new students of compliance,
at least within law, share certain normative values, including the belief
that more effective international regulation is better than less, and not a
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few of them contend as well that effective international regulation is
positively related to the rise of "liberal" (democratic) states.7
The new compliance scholars recognize that the "why" question has
not been totally ignored in the past.' Much of the work of many international lawyers in the UN era has attempted to show how international
law is created and enforced. Long before Louis Henkin gave voice to
what many international lawyers believe as an article of faith, the real
world effects of treaties, custom, or other sources of international law
have been a central preoccupation for international lawyers as well as
for those who have seen international lawyers' aspirations as a blight on
the making of optimal foreign policy. 9 As readers of many of the contributions to this volume will see, there is much in the current
''compliance" literature that is reminiscent of traditional international
law scholarship, including work that never purported to be about
"compliance" as such. Thus, many of the doctrinal analyses by the
"father of UN studies," Louis B. Sohn, address a central issue that continues to preoccupy several of the authors in this volume: how to use
international institutions to achieve, at least within a limited field, governance without government. Much of Sohn's work-including his 1994
book on the evolution of the UN's treatment of South Africa,' ° his numerous descriptions of how organizations engage, in constitutional
interpretation," or his ground-breaking sets of teaching materials' 2-are
7. Advocates of "liberal" compliance share a close affinity with advocates of the
"liberal peace" including those who have created a "Kantian revival" within the fields of
international law and international relations. See, e.g., Andrew Hurrell, Kant and the Kantian
Paradigm in International Relations, 16 REV. INT'L STUD. 183 (1990); Ulrick Petersman,
Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 398
(1996/97); Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of
Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41 (1993) [hereinafter Slaughter, Europe Before the Court];
Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53

(1992).
8. Indeed, Henkin himself addressed, albeit briefly, the "why" question posed in this
essay's title. See HENKIN,supra note 1, at 49-68.
9. Compare GRENVILLE CLARK & Louis B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD
LAW (2d ed. 1960) with GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, 95-103

(1984). In the past, the "compliance" issue was frequently discussed in the guise of debates
over whether international norms were efficacious enough to be considered worthy of the
term "law." For an example of the debate's real world significance, compare Robert H. Bork,
The Limits of "InternationalLaw, 18 THE NAT'L INTEREST 3 (1989/90) with Judge Robert H.

Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
10. See LOUIS B. SOHN, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOUTH
AFRICA (1994).
11. See Louis B. Sohn, Interpreting the Law, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 169
(Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
12. See Louis B. SOHN, CASES ON UN LAW (2d ed. 1967).
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case examples of the "international legal process" at work or, in the lanenthusiasts, are nicely documented international
guage of Yale
3 School
"incidents."
Indeed, the first generation of post-UN international law scholars
were "present at the creation" of the United Nations and other international organizations because they foresaw these institutions' potential
for giving effect to, as well as promulgating, the international rule of
law. Careful readers of their early analyses know that their authors recognized the potential significance of, for example, the new international
secretariats who would set the agenda and prepare initial drafts, entice
some States to comply through the provision of carrots or threaten others through non-coercive sticks, or help establish or solidify
bureaucratic alliances of transnational elites, often within a profession
with a common outlook. 14 Astute students of international organizations
recognized long ago that the work of even extremely specialized bodies
tends to incrementally expand, through "functional spillover," to permit
regulation of other matters, such that, for example, GATr panels begin
dealing with rules governing the environment or financial lenders begin
considering human rights. 5 Further, Sohn's work, like the work of others of his generation, illustrates many times over how evolving
constitutional interpretation within an international organization helps
construct the identifies of relevant actors and permits the selfconstitution of international society-an insight that new self-styled
"constructivists" are now rediscovering with considerable fanfare.
So what is "new and improved" about the new work on implementation, compliance and effectiveness? Recent scholarship puts on the
table, as the central focus of inquiry, issues that were only incidentally
addressed in much prior work. Today's compliance literature pays closer
attention to what drives relevant actors, including private multinational
13. See ABRAM CHAYES ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968);

INTER-

NATIONAL INCIDENTS (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988); Myres S.

McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959). For a description of the impact of these works,
and the two U.S. "schools" of international law of which they were part, see Koh, supra note
3, at 2617-24.
14. Compare SOHN, supra note 12, with Ronald Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An
Overview, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL. LAW I

(James Cameron et al. eds., 1996).
15. For recent work involving "spillover" effects, see Anne-Marie Burley & Walter
Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration,47 INT'L ORG. 41,
55 (1993); Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, The World Trade Organization, and the Liberal Projectto Reconceptualize InternationalLaw, 5 Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
16. See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, ConstructingInternationalPolitics, 20 INT'L SECURITY
71 (1995); Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the InternationalState, 88
AM. POL. SCi. REV. 384 (1994).
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corporations, non-governmental organizations, and governments, to
"give effect" to international law. Some of the new compliance scholars
ask directly whether the impact of law lies within the realm of unconscious habit, as opposed to calibrated, conscious self-interested
decision, or internalized (perhaps even moralistic) obedience.' 7 More
than ever before, there is a concerted effort to determine, and even
sometimes to measure empirically, whether economic sanctions or other
"coercive" methods are essential or of greater efficacy, as many assume,
or whether less confrontational, more "managerialist" approaches, such
as information exchange or financial inducements, are more effective.' 8
The resulting scholarship has given new life to old inquiries. Hoary
doctrinal analyses regarding the sources of international law, for
example, are being revived by renewed consideration of whether
international actors comply with different sources of international
obligations at different rates. Thus, a new project by ASIL, initially
supported by the National Science Foundation and involving a number
of prominent scholars, examines the hypothesis that under some
circumstances international actors, including States, comply with legally
nonbinding instruments (whether designated as "soft law" or merely as
"political obligations") at least as well as they do with binding
obligations duly recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.' 9 Much of the new scholarship renews the
vitality of international organization as a field of study within
international law since a basic line of analysis concerns the potential
impact of institutionalization. Further, at a time of increased
specialization within a field with proliferating sub-specialties and a
decline in scholars of a generalist persuasion, 0 these "compliance"
studies contain a refreshingly eclectic mix of examples from distinct
substantive fields, posing issues across increasingly irrelevant
private/public divides; indeed, at least some of the new work seeks to
identify generalizable propositions irrespective of whether one is
addressing, for example, access to markets or arms control.2'

17. Thus, Professor Harold Koh indicates that he is interested in the distinction between

four types of relationships between norms and conduct: "coincidence," "conformity,"
"compliance," and "obedience." Koh, supra note 3, at 2599 n. 3.

18. For one survey of "carrot" as opposed to "stick" approaches, see generally, Mitchell,
supra note 14.
19. See INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 5.

20. Indeed, Thomas Franck, undoubtedly one of the few remaining generalists in the
field, has suggested that international law 'has entered the stage of the "practitionerspecialist." Franck, supra note 2, at 4.
21. For attempts to apply "compliance" insights across distinct sub-specialties within
international law, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:

Why Nations Behave
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At the same time, the new compliance scholarship has developed a
new vocabulary, much of it drawn from law and economics (especially
game theory). The "managerial" school typifies much of the new work
and is a necessary point of departure for all the contributions to this
volume. To managerialists like Antonia and Abram Chayes, sovereignty
today consists of status, which they define essentially as "membership
in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance
of international life."2 Under the Chayeses' neo-functionalist view of
international law, States are driven to comply with the edicts of these
regimes, often connected to UN system organizations, out of
enlightened self-interest and through non-coercive tools such as
reporting, verification, and monitoring requirements more often than
through the use of military or economic sanctions. To managerialists,
the very existence of international bureaucracies whose raisons d'&re
are the treaty regimes they supervise helps make compliance with
international law possible and likely. Drawing from the work of
disciplines other than law, including political scientists who study the
impact of "epistemic communities" of technocrats (from free traders to
whalers),23 Chayes and Chayes identify how international organizations
help resolve the characteristic problems that, in their view, most often
undermine compliance with international law. According to their view,
organizations provide discursive forums to resolve the ambiguity or
indeterminacy of norms, grant technical assistance to help States willing
but unable to comply, and offer standing mechanisms that permit legal
norms to adjust and adapt to changing conditions and circumstances.
For these authors, as for Louis Henkin, the willful flouting of legal
obligations are the exception (not the rule) and the "managerial"
techniques that characterize international organizations are the tools that
most often effectuate compliance. 4
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); INTERNATIONAL

COMPLIANCE, supra note 5.

22. As noted by Chayes and Chayes:
To be a player, the state must submit to the pressures that international regulations
impose ....

The need to be an accepted member in this complex web of interna-

tional arrangements is itself the critical factor in ensuring acceptable compliance
with regulatory agreements.... Sovereignty ... is status-the vindication of the

state's existence as a member of the international system. In today's setting, the
only way most states can realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international system.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 21, at 27.
23. See generally Power, and International Policy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. (1992)

(special issue devoted to studies of epistemic communities in distinct international settings).
24. Thus, the Chayeses indicate that "it is no coincidence that the regimes with the most
impressive compliance strategies-ILO, IMF, OECD, GATT/WTO-are operated by sub-
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Other subscribers to the managerial school, like Professor Kenneth
Abbott, have focused even more directly on the role of international organizations and have stressed that these institutions are not the mere
passive agents of states or the mere repositories of cooperation but are
instruments for the rational maximization of preferences, that is, agents
producing collective goods, collaborating in prisoner's dilemmas, or
resolving coordination problems. Analogizing to private transactions,
Abbott identifies the various roles some organizations have assumed,
including as "trustee" for the holding of assets (as in connection with
Iraqi oil revenue), as "allocator" of scarce resources among claimants
(as the UN Compensation Commission), or as "arbiter" through everything from formalized adjudicative fora to the "good offices" function of
the UN Secretary-General. Abbott judges international organizations
from the standpoint of economic efficiency and, in a surprise to critics
of international bureaucracy, praises them for permitting greater centralization, raising the price of defection by lengthening the shadow of
the future, stabilizing expectations, reducing transaction costs, and increasing transparency. Further, Abbott argues that the resort to an
international organization (as for the use of force or for conditioned development assistance) legitimizes what would be troublesome if pursued
by one state or a group of states, thereby fulfilling the same intermediary "laundering" mechanism that "independent" organizations often
assume within domestic legal systems."
David S. Ardia's contribution here, addressing the inadequacies with
respect to existing treaty regimes to protect the marine environment and
proposing a new International Marine Monitoring and Coordination
Agency, is heir to the legacy of "traditional" scholars like Louis Sohn.
Indeed, Ardia emulates the style (and optimism) of Sohn's reformist
agenda.26 As Ardia's article suggests, much of the new compliance work
dovetails nicely with prior international law scholarship. On the other
hand, Ardia's contribution here is also heir to the new "managerialist"
school of compliance studies, epitomized by the Chayeses' conception
of the "new sovereignty." Ardia's analysis of environmental problems
stantial, well-staffed, and, for the most part, well functioning international organizations"
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 21, at 271.
25. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Kenneth W. Abbott, Formal Organizations and International Politics, (Oct. 1996) (working draft on file with author).
26. For a recent discussion, see Louis B. Sohn, Important Improvements in the Functioning of the Principal Organs of the United Nations That Can be Made without Charter
Revision, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 652 (1997).
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reflects managerialist assumptions concerning the role of normative
rhetoric; his recommendations are premised on an assumption that
effective international rule-making requires appeals to States' long and
short term interests and rests on a serious attempt to make the norms
relevant to such interests, including States' concerns for their
reputations. Like Abbott, Ardia argues that success here depends on
using institutions, at both the national and international level, to provide
information and to link such information with multifarious threats to
enforce."
Natasha A. Affolder's contribution to this volume, which deals
with the use of anonymous witnesses in the course of criminal trials
within the ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, addresses how an institutionalized dispute settler strives
to achieve a legitimate conclusion with respect to a difficult
evidentiary issue that, at least to some extent, pits international
lawyers from common law countries against their continental
counterparts. Her contribution, which ties institutional legitimacy to
the use of pedigreed traditional sources of international law, is an apt
illustration of the continued vitality of venerable debates about the role
of such sources (and of precedent) in international tribunals. It reminds
us that the effectiveness and rate of compliance with both national and
international judicial decisions continues to hold a particular (if
predictable) fascination for "compliance" analysts within international
law--as does study of the "integrative" potential of judicial action. 29 In
fact, thanks in part to the perceived success of the European Court of
Justice and other international tribunals, a model of compliance
premised on the significance of "liberal" concepts of the judicial role
has emerged, 0 along with an ambitious theoretical construct for
"effective" supranational adjudication generally.' Others, including
Professor Thomas Franck, have attempted to describe more generally
how international dispute settlers increase perceptions of fairness or
27. Cf Keohane, supra note 5, at 495-501.
28. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS

OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS (M.K. Butlerman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996); INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISION IN NATIONAL COURTS
(Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996); LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 327-71 (John H. Jackson et al. eds.,

3d ed. 1995); The Interaction Between National Courts and International Tribunals, 28
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. (1995-96).
29. See, e.g., Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2409 (1991)
(describing how a handful of judges in Luxembourg, working quietly and steadily, transformed a treaty into a constitution and an international organ into a constitutional court).

30. See, e.g., Slaughter, Europe Before the Court, supra note 7.
31. See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273 (1997).
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legitimacy." While Affolder does not undertake such general
conclusions, her work here, part of a growing number of scholarly
critiques of procedural aspects of the new ad hoc international criminal
tribunals at The Hague and in Arusha, Tanzania,33 is grounded in the
proposition that international trials, no less than domestic ones, need to
be seen as "fair" by both litigants and outside observers if their verdicts
are to prove effective.
Christopher Joyner's contribution to this volume, which examines
the role of "soft law" in the Antarctic treaty regime, is part of a growing
wave of new work dealing with the impact and nature of "soft"
international legal norms, as well as the complex interplay/continuum
between "hard" and "soft" obligations. 4 Like much of the new
scholarship, Joyner takes for granted that the three-fold traditional
sources of international law no longer provide an accurate sense of the
sources of current international obligations, or more significantly, of the
process by which international obligations develop and solidify. Like
Frederic Kirgis's recent compilation of "law-making processes" used in
UN specialized agencies or Jonathan Charney's enumeration of the
many techniques now prevalent for the making of "universal
international law,"3 Joyner's contribution illustrates modern processes
for international law-making, albeit within a relatively discrete regime
involving only a few international actors. Joyner's analysis of the
incipient years of an international regime that has not yet become
institutionalized, as through the creation of permanent secretariat or
other organs, is also likely to be of interest to historians of

32. See

FRANCK,

supra note 2;

THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY

AMONG NATIONS (1990).

33. See Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the InternationalWar Crimes Tribunal:
Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519 (1997); Monroe
Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 235 (1996); Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of
Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349 (1997); Daniel D. Natanda Nsereko, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the InternationalTribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.
F. 507 (1994); Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 25
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305 (1997).
34. See INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 5. But see Prosper Weil, Towards
Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983) (disparaging the
tendency to examine international law along a spectrum of binding force, from "hard" to
"soft").
35. Frederic L. Kirgis, Specialized Law-Making Processes, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL
ORDER (Oscar Schachter & Christopher Joyner eds., 1995); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal
InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993). See also Oscar Schachter, United Nations
Law,88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994) (canvassing the wide range of UN law).
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institutionalization in other contexts3 6 and is an apt illustration of the
determinative role played by technological developments in the
evolution of international regulation.37 Joyner also reminds us that
effectiveness need not be synonymous with costly bureaucratization.38
Kenneth J. Vandevelde's article in this volume takes a historical
look at north/south and east/west perspectives with respect to foreign
investment. Vandelvelde implicitly refutes the proposition that we live
in an exceptional epoch at the "end of history," where we can afford to
act on the premise that global capital has permanently won the day. His
piece, which urges legal reforms in the name of securing "sustainable"
investment regimes amenable to both exporters and importers of capital,
acknowledges that the all too brief post-Cold War enthusiasm for
Western-styled democratic governance, capitalism and privatization (if
it ever truly existed at the global level) has given way to contentious
notions of nationalism, fundamentalism, cultural relativism, and varying
concepts of "democracy." As does Benedict Kingsbury's general tour
d'horizon with respect to compliance studies that is also a part of this
volume, Vandelvelde's article implies that the new "liberal" theorists
and neo-Kantians who are intent on extrapolating from the integrative
model of the European Union (EU) and its court will need to deflect
criticism that they are merely 'neoimperialists' seeking to export
European values to the 'neocolonized.' Both Vandelvelde's and
Kingsbury's pieces implicitly warn that realities have begun to intrude
on the plausible lessons that can be drawn from regional systems for
integration, and that the prospects for increased European integration
are now in doubt, as are the prospects for expansion of the NAFTA to
the rest of -the Americas. Internationalists, they suggest, including
liberal theorists, may have been overly hasty in relegating the concept of
"sovereignty" to the dustbin of history since, after all, most international
36. Within international law, this would include students of GATT' developments prior
to the emergence of the WTO or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe's
(CSCE) evolution into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
37. For an interesting attempt to explain international regulation in a discrete area that
has also been dramatically affected by rapid technological change, see Enrico Colombatto &
Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the
Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1996) (applying public choice constructs to the Basel Accords and to insider trading regulation).
38. This is true as well of much of Jacobson's and Weiss' work dealing with environmental regimes. See Jacobson & Weiss, STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE, supra note 6. It also
characterizes a central insight in the work of other authors, including political scientists like
Ronald Mitchell. See Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution
and Treaty Compliance, 48 INT'L ORG. 425 (1994) (concluding that treaty restrictions on
allowable maritime discharges are less effective than preventive measures that limit permissible tanker equipment, thereby suggesting that some international regimes are efficacious
because their mechanisms for compliance are decentralized).
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regimes, including the EU, remain institutions for the maintenance of
"sovereignty" (however "new") rather than its eclipse.
Vandevelde and Kingsbury also imply that the much touted "liberal"
peace remains in doubt. Whether or not liberal democracies have or
have not failed to make war on each other as some assert, no one denies
that democracies, even in their all too brief existence in the sweep of
human history, have waged brutal internal wars and wars by proxy. 9 The
alleged connection between "liberal" states (variously and not always
consistently defined) and "effective" international organization and
compliance remains to be demonstrated. It remains unproven that treaties concluded among liberal democracies endure longer, are more likely
to reflect "mutual trust," or are more "specific" or "detailed" and less
ambiguous, or are accompanied by better enforcement through more
effective international organizations and the use of domestic courts4 ° It
is not even clear why the last should be seen as an inevitable characteristic of a more effective treaty. Counter examples can be found for all
these propositions, along with plausible explanations. It is not clear that
"liberal" governments are more likely to take a "monist" position with
respect to international law (whatever that phrase might be taken to
mean) or that the greater openness of democratic societies facilitates
and does not actually hamper compliance with international agreements.4' Further, as even some of the liberal theorists acknowledge, the
supposed cause and effect relationship between "democratic governance" and compliance with international law remains fuzzy. Is the
argument premised on the idea that global economic liberalization promotes political liberalization (which in turn promotes international law
compliance)? If so, what do we do with counter-examples? Moreover,
those who propose grandiose new intergovernmental regimes today need
to address the resentments prompted by the regimes that currently exist,
even within rich nations of the north, never mind between north and
south. As the history of foreign investment surveyed by Vandevelde
suggests, States of the south are likely to require much more in the way
of demonstrable proof of likely benefits and many more guarantees
against likely abuse before they willingly cede fundamental decisions
determinative of their political future to new organizations that are
likely to be dominated, like the old, by the north.

39. As U.S. Gallup polls on the eve of the Gulf War suggest, even democratic polities
can be "propagandized" to extol war-making.
40. Cf Slaughter, Europe Before the Court,supra note 7, at 532.
41. Cf. Jacobson & Weiss, STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE, supra note 6, at 142 (noting
that democratization does not inevitably lead to improved compliance).
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At the same time, Vandevelde shares with other contributors here,
namely Affolder, Ardia, and Joyner, a confidence in international law's
continuing power to facilitate discourse and elicit voluntary compliance
through non-coercive methods.
Professor George Downs' contribution to this volume evinces no
such confidence but instead targets "managerial" premises and conclusions. Downs' fundamental critique of "cooperation," along with
Benedict Kingsbury's more jurisprudential survey of the diverse premises of those now engaged in the study of compliance, are apt reminders
of the formidable hurdles the new compliance scholars face. Both of
these contributions suggest that the new students of compliance, despite
optimistic prognostications,42 cannot afford to presume that international
actors behave.
Downs' contribution here, when joined with his other work elsewhere, is a powerful challenge to lawyers' faith that the treaties and
other texts they help draft make a difference to the real world behavior
of relevant actors (and especially of powerful states).4'3 Nor are Downs'
critiques likely to find a receptive audience only within a relatively narrow set of neorealist political scientists; in the wake of the "new world
disorder" of ethnic nationalisms and renewed genocides, Downs' skepticism is likely to be widely shared. Downs' critiques inspire questions
about Henkin's threefold hedge ("almost all") concealed in the quotation cited at the outset of this foreword. Does confidence in international
law's overall efficacy duck fundamental questions about the particular?
Elsewhere, Downs has suggested that those international obligations
most likely to be disregarded tend to be those of the greatest import
(including norms against mass violations of human rights)." Downs'
contribution here serves notice that the "post-ontological" age may not
yet be nigh.
Kingsbury situates Downs' neorealist critique within a rich tapestry
of other approaches. His is an attempt to suggest the complexities of
what has been unduly simplified as simply the study of "correspondence
of behavior with legal rules." Kingsbury has a number of agendas, including to indicate the need for shared understandings as to underlying
theories of law, to illustrate the value of interdisciplinary work by political
42. See Koh, supra note 3, at 2599 n. 2 (arguing that broad empirical work "seems
largely to have confirmed" Henkin's "hedged but optimistic description"). See also FRANCK,
supra note 2, at 6, 9 (suggesting that international lawyers need no longer defend their field's
existence).
43. See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News
about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?,50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).

44. Cf Downs et. al, supra note 43. Notably, the leading "managerialist" tract, by
Chayes and Chayes, scarcely mentions human rights concerns.
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scientists and lawyers, to critique a purely "instrumentalist" account of
international norms, to suggest the artificiality of an exclusive focus on
the behavior of States, and to indicate the need to complement the study
of what goes on in the international realm with awareness of what goes
on within nation states. Kingsbury's article also shows that those who
examine compliance issues are likely to face criticism even from internationalists who believe that international rules "matter" but who also
believe that the current vogue for quasi-scientific examination of the
determinants of implementation, compliance, or effectiveness, especially when it aspires to empirical testing of the causal relevance of
identified sources of international obligations at particular moments in
time, may be fruitless. He reminds us that especially for those for whom
the international process is best understood as itself constitutive of the
identity of states and of relevant actors' interests, attempts to test the
"effectiveness" of law or states' "compliance" with law, if grounded in
assumptions of rational, unitary actors acting on the basis of exogenously determined preferences, are of doubtful value."5
More generally, Kingsbury's demonstration that the seemingly unproblematic concept of "compliance" contains problematic and
competing conceptions of law suggests that scholars of implementation,
.compliance, and effectiveness cannot escape fundamental challenges all
international lawyers face. It is possible that studies of effectiveness
may conclude that, contrary to the hopes of internationalists, international fora or domestic procedures based on international sources of
obligation are sometimes counterproductive-if, for example, international criminal proceedings before international tribunals prove less
conducive to national reconciliation than alternatives (including blanket
amnesties or truth and reconciliation commissions established under
domestic authority) or if multilateral conventions' lowest common denominator "solutions" prove less efficacious than a hegemon's
concerted efforts to enforce extraterritorially its own domestic law to the
same ends. The attempt to construct a "recipe book" for effective international regulation may, contrary to hopes of earnest internationalists,
reveal that "top-down" regulatory models premised on the primacy of
international rules may not always work well. In addition, as Oscar
Schachter has suggested, the attempt to make international law more
effective or to elicit more compliance may only prompt renewed challenges to international regulation from both the "left" and the "right"from those who demand more accountable forms of regulation involving
45. See Wendt, supra note 16. As George Downs' contribution in this volume suggests,

however, the constructivist perspective, which bears considerable affinity to the
"transformationalist challenge" that he addresses, also challenges neorealist tenets.
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greater respect for participatory democracy and are more attuned to local community sentiments and from those libertarians who demand less
governmental interference with the market at any level." Those who
examine compliance issues are also likely to have to face the bemused
contempt of the postmoderns. It may do no good to convince people that
international law is "efficacious law" to the extent law, domestic or international, is seen as merely politics by other means.
Alternatively, it may be that the current vogue for examining compliance will only serve to repackage issues long familiar to students of
international law. At the end of the day, it may be that the new scholarship will only tell us what many of us thought we already knew: namely,
that there is an "transnational legal process" that works in direct and
indirect ways on a variety of actors, domestic and international, through
a variety of fora, political as well as legal. 8
The formidable nature of the challenges faced by the new compliance scholars is, however, a tribute to the centrality of the issues they
seek to address. Given the significance of the quest, it is to be hoped that
the current enthusiasm for examining implementation, compliance and
effectiveness will endure. Whatever the fate of the genre as a whole, the
individual articles selected by the student editors of this journal for this
volume deserve to be read, in any case, for the light that they shed on
why nations behave.

46. See Schachter, supra note 4, at 21-22. As Schachter indicates, international lawyers

have not yet emerged with a recipe for international law-making that gives effect to emerging
notions of "international civil society" apart from recourse to the traditional role of the nation-state. Id. at 14-15 & 22. See also Martti Koskenniemi, The Wonderful Artificiality of
States, 88 PROC. AM. SOCIETY INT'L L. 22, 28-29 (1995). For a critique of NGO's that

seems relevant in this respect, see Peter J. Spiro, The Global Potentates: Nongovernmental
Organizations and the "Unregulated" Marketplace, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996). For an

examination of the resurgence of "sovereignty" concerns, including federal/state issues,
within the context of the new WTO, see Jackson, supra note 4. For a challenge to both neorealists and international lawyers who pin their hopes on international institutions, see
Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics,

51 INT. ORG. 513 (1997).
47. See generally MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989); David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L. J. 1 (1988); Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in
Public InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 81 (1991); Symposium, International Law,
Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. (1996-97).

48. For a preliminary attempt to define a new conception of the "transactional legal
process" that is distinguishable from both the New Haven School of Policy Science or the
Harvard "international legal process" school of Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld see Koh,
supra note 3, at 2618-24 & 2645-58. See also Harold H. Koh, TransnationalLegal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).

